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THE AUTHORITY TO BRING
PRIVATE TREBLE-DAMAGE SUITS
UNDER "RICO" SHOULD BE REFORMED

This memorandum details some of the serious problems
that have arisen with the authorization for private treble

damage suits under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") title of the Organized Crime Control

Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

It explains why reform

of those provisions is necessary now.
INTRODUCTION

I.

With little discussion, Congress in 1970 added the
provision for private civil suits to a bill that was primarily
designed to give the Department of Justice new criminal

enforcement tools to attack "the mob."

The language of the

statute was drafted broadly to give the Justice Department

adequate latitude in prosecuting persistent offenders, even
if they are not members of traditional criminal syndicates.

Congress expected, however, that the Justice Department, in

exercising its enforcement discretion, would be faithful to

the expressed congressional purpose to direct the new criminal
sanctions against "organized crime," as experienced prosecutors
understand that term.

The Justice Department, in fact, has

adopted formal guidelines to avoid abusive or excessive use of
the broad language of RICO, and has exercised discretion in

selecting cases for prosecution under RICO.
The provision for private civil suits was added very

late in the legislative process and was intended to have the
same focus:

protecting legitimate businesses from incursions

by professional criminals.

However, Congress did not include

any specific mechanism to confine private civil suits to cases
involving the activities of "organized crime."

Private claimants invoking the broadly phrased
statute have not shown any of the discipline exercised by
the Justice Department in its selective use of this powerful

new weapon.

As a result, inventive private lawyers seeking

treble damages are successfully arguing for the most sweeping

interpretation of RICO’s broad language and are attempting
to apply RICO in contexts far removed from those conceived by
the statute’s supporters.

RICO claims are now added as a

matter of course in virtually all cases challenging securities

transactions or alleging some type of commercial fraud.

RICO

also crops up in landlord-tenant and real estate disputes,
attorney-client conflicts, and even divorce battles.

By

contrast, only a tiny handful of the hundreds of cases alleg

ing private civil claims under RICO involve either the people

or the conduct that supporters of the bill sought to attack.
Without any of the restraint and responsibility that

governs the decisions of public prosecutors, private lawyers

are invoking civil RICO on behalf of private clients to level
charges of "racketeering" against reputable businessmen and

professionals such as investment bankers, brokers, and account
ants.

Although RICO was intended to protect legitimate

business, the statute is now primarily being used to attack

established businesses and firms.
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The threat to bring a

"racketeering " charge sometimes coerces settlements before the
filing of a RICO complaint, while the actual filing of a RICO

complaint exposes businessmen to continuing embarrassment and

expense.

Some judges have attempted to restrict the uses of
the civil RICO provision to the kinds of case that Congress
contemplated.

Most appellate courts, however, have rejected

these limitations, explaining that they feel obliged to

apply the sweeping phrasing of the statute as it is written.
Several appellate courts have explicitly stated that relief

from the overly broad coverage of RICO must come from Congress.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATUTE
PERMITS OVERLY BROAD USE
The private civil RICO statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

Under that provision, a person may file a civil RICO action if

he claims to have been "injured in his business or property by

reason of" the defendant’s "pattern of racketeering activity."
The plaintiff may recover treble damages as well as costs and

attorney’s fees.

The private civil claim under RICO involves

three components.

A.

The Predicate Offenses:
"Racketeering Activity"

Because Congress doubted that it could adequately

define "organized crime" in a criminal statute, it chose
instead to focus on the types of conduct in which organized
crime figures engage.

The key to RICO coverage is an extensive

list of "predicate" offenses that are defined as constituting

3

"racketeering activity."

18 U.S.C. § 1961.

These include

a variety of violent crimes, such as murder, kidnapping,
extortion, and arson — crimes that one normally associates

with organized crime.

In addition, because of some indica

tions that organized crime was involved in trafficking in

stolen or counterfeit securities and similar kinds of activity,
the list of predicate offenses was expanded to include mail

fraud, wire fraud, and "fraud in the sale of securities."
B.

A "Pattern" of Racketeering Activity

The commission of any two predicate acts within a

ten year period is defined to be a "pattern" of racketeering
activity.

The initial step in a plaintiff's civil RICO claim

is to assert that a "person" — including the whole spectrum

of legitimate business corporations, associations, partner
ships, and their executives — committed two predicate acts

within ten years and thus engaged in a "pattern of racketeer
ing activity."
Unfortunately, this sweeping coverage makes virtually

any businessman or business organization a potential target of
a RICO claim.

Since the two predicate offenses need not be

separated in time or involve different transactions, a single
commercial transaction that generates a dispute can be alleged

to constitute a "pattern of racketeering."

For example, an

investor may allege simply that a securities transaction
consisting of two steps involved fraud.

This allegation would

make out a "pattern of racketeering activity" involving "fraud

4

in the sale of securities" and would allow the claimant to

circumvent various procedural and substantive limitations on
damage suits under the securities laws.

Similarly, a would-

be RICO plaintiff may assert that two separate copies of a

financial statement, bill, contract, advertisement or other
document involved in a "fraudulent" transaction were sent
through the mails.

An accusation of this type effectively

creates a private civil claim for "mail fraud," which before
RICO had never been the basis for a civil suit under federal

law.

See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170,

1177-79 (6th Cir. 1980).

C.

The "Enterprise" Requirement

RICO also requires that the person commit the
predicate acts in a particular relationship to an "enter

prise."

Under the statute, it is unlawful to obtain any

interest in an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering
activity, or to control an enterprise through such activity,

or to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through racketeer
ing activity.

18 U.S.C. § 1962.

Depending on the facts, a

plaintiff can easily satisfy the "enterprise" requirement

in actions against legitimate businesses or businessmen by

alleging that, for example, the defendant corporation or

professional partnership is the "enterprise" that is conduct

ing its affairs improperly.

5

III. THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL
"RICO" SHOWS A PURPOSE TO PROTECT
LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES

The bill that became the 1970 Organized Crime Control
Act, including the RICO title, originated in the Senate.

The

Senate report stated unambiguously the objective of the legis
lation :

"[T]he eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new
penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime."
S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969)
(emphasis added).
In this vein, Senator McClellan, the bill’s chief sponsor and
a longtime foe of organized crime, focused his arguments for

the bill on the insidious activities of "La Cosa Nostra."
Cong. Rec. 585-86 (1970).

116

In particular, his sponsorship

reflected awareness that, when "organized crime moves into a

business, it usually brings to that venture all the techniques

of violence and intimidation which it used in its illegal
businesses."

115 Cong. Rec. 5874 (1969).

The Senate RICO bill contained no provision for civil

suits when introduced or when initially passed by the Senate.
The possibility of providing a private civil remedy had sur
faced as part of other bills.

The purpose of those proposals

was, just as with RICO itself, to protect legitimate business

men who are victimized by the infiltration of their businesses
by organized crime or are subjected to unfair competition from

6

mob-controlled businesses.

Drawing on the language and

concepts used in the treble-damage section of the Clayton
Antitrust Act, the civil remedy proposed in those bills

reflected the intent:
"(T]o apply the antitrust or civil features of
our law to the invasion of legitimate businesses
by members of the organized crime community."
Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judi
ciary on S. 30, etc., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 150
(1969) (statement of Senator Hruska on S. 1623
and S. 1861) .
The Senate wanted to provide a mechanism to respond to reports
that "organized crime has begun to penetrate" some legitimate

businesses, such as securities firms from which it was steal
ing securities.

Rec. 591 (1970)

See S. Rep. No. 617, supra, at 77; 116 Cong.
(remarks of Sen. McClellan).

The House shared this concern about the infiltration

of organized crime into businesses across the nation.

Thus,

Congressman Poff, a leading proponent of the legislation,

pointed to the takeover of a jukebox business by "a mafia
boss" as an illustration of the general understanding that
RICO was meant to protect legitimate business people injured

by organized crime.

116 Cong. Rec. 6709 (1970).

A private civil remedy finally was added to the RICO
legislation in the House Judiciary Committee at the urging

of Representative Steiger, who submitted the draft of the
language that ultimately became law.

In submitting the

amendment, Representative Steiger explained that his proposal
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was designed to add a private remedy to help in the fight
"to deal with organized crime."

Organized Crime Control:

Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the

Judiciary on S. 30 and Related Proposals Relating to the
Control of Organized Crime in the United States., 91st Cong.,

2d Sess. 519 (1970).

He carefully emphasized his understand

ing that RICO was designed "to prevent and reverse the corrupt

infiltration of legitimate commercial activities by ruthless
organized criminals."

Id. at 519.

So as to leave no room

to doubt that he expected that the new statute, including
his civil damage remedy, would be directed against "ruthless,
organized criminals," Representative Steiger described examples

of penetration of legitimate businesses by various "families"
of "La Cosa Nostra" — the Mafia.

Id.

In the sparse debate

on the civil damage provision when the bill reached the House
floor, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Represen

tative Celler, explained that the addition of a treble-damage

remedy was to be one of the tools "designed to inhibit the
infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."

116

Cong. Rec. 35,196 (1970).
The Senate accepted the House version of the bill,

including the new provision for private civil suits, without

any suggestion that the focus of congressional concern —
protection of legitimate businessmen -- had been shifted in
the slightest.

Indeed, Senator McClellan described the House

amendments, including the addition of the civil provision, as
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relatively minor changes.

116 Cong. Rec. 36,292-96 (1970).

At no time did anyone ever suggest that the private civil

remedy was intended for use against legitimate business
people, corporations, or partnerships of licensed profes

sionals, or was to be used in commercial disputes having
nothing whatever to do with the activities of the people

who were and are commonly recognized as "organized crime."
IV. THE USE OF THE PRIVATE CIVIL DAMAGE
PROVISION HAS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED
THE CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVE

In light of the unambiguous congressional focus,

civil RICO actions should closely parallel criminal prosecu
tions and should attack similar kinds of conduct.

Instead,

almost none of the uses of the civil remedy has involved
organized crime figures or the kinds of offense committed by

organized crime figures.
Rather, civil RICO is used almost exclusively in

commercial disputes.

The statute is now being invoked in

every kind of litigation where the predicate offense of

■fraud" can possibly be alleged.

Virtually all of these

claims are either covered by specific federal regulatory
laws such as the securities laws or do not belong in the
federal courts at all.

In the vast majority of cases, civil

RICO claims are being used as weapons against the very people
Congress was seeking to protect:

legitimate business people.

Not only have these developments distorted congressional

expectations, but they also present widely recognized and

increasing opportunities for abuse.
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A.

The Ability Of A Private Lawyer
To Charge A Person With Criminal
"Racketeering" Is Easily Abused

RICO is unprecedented in authorizing private lawyers
who are representing purely private clients to invoke the

judicial process by charging another private person with
Under RICO, the private lawyer exercises power that

crimes.

normally is reserved to public officials and grand jurors:
the power to lodge a formal accusation of crime.

Those public

officials and grand jurors, of course, have a duty of fairness

and restraint in deciding whether to make that kind of accusa

tion.

As the Supreme Court once described the special respon

sibilities of prosecutors:
"The United States Attorney is the representa
tive not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer." Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 86, 88 (1935).
A private lawyer, by contrast, owes allegiance

to his client’s private interest, not to a higher sense of
justice.

His interest is not in impartiality, but in partisan

advocacy.

He is his client’s servant, not the servant of the

law.

His client’s interest is not that "justice" be done, but

that he obtain money from the defendant.

Because of these fundamental differences, our system

surrounds the exercise of prosecutorial power with many legal
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and ethical restrictions.

The officials who exercise prosecu

torial discretion are accountable to the public for their

judgments.

As a further shield against overzealousness, the

Constitution interposes grand jurors who, like the prosecutor

himself, are sworn to secrecy while the prosecutor is attempt
ing to demonstrate that there is substantial evidence to

justify a proposed criminal charge.

None of these restric

tions, however, applies to a private lawyer who is considering

filing a civil lawsuit in order to promote his client’s

financial interests.
As construed by most courts, RICO effectively

licenses private parties to go into federal courts to level
formal and explicit charges that other citizens have engaged

in serious federal and state crimes and, by allegedly doing
so, have made themselves "racketeers."

The private claimant’s

power to brand a businessman or firm a "racketeer" may cause
almost as much irreversible injury to the legitimate business

man as may an unwarranted criminal charge.

Business rivals

may use this power to gain economic advantage without actually

having to go beyond the threat to file a civil RICO suit.

The

people who are monitoring the actual use of civil RICO know
that this is the reality, not mere speculation.

Ironically,

civil RICO thus creates an opportunity to engage in a form of
extortion, even though the criminal features of the statute

are geared to prevent similar exactions.
In creating the civil remedy as a virtual after

thought, Congress failed to give any real attention to the
- 11

enormous power being delegated to private lawyers and clients.
Nor did it consider how to safeguard this power or to protect
the innocent against abuse.

This basic flaw in the design of

civil RICO created great potential for costly and damaging
misuse.

As discussed below, experience in recent years has

shown that this regrettable potential has become the reality.
B.

Civil RICO Suits Are Directed
Mostly At Well Established
Businesses, Not Organized Crime

The American Bar Association’s special RICO Task
Force recently collected comprehensive data about 118 private

civil RICO cases, almost all of which were reported in the

last three years.1/
Only one civil case involved a kind of
violent offense traditionally associated with organized crime:

arson.

One other alleged a usurious loan, one alleged extor

tion and four alleged bribery or commercial bribery.

In

dramatic contrast, 93 involved simply some form of alleged

business "fraud", more than half of which were described as

dealing with "securities fraud" and "tender offer" disputes;
the balance were mainly "commercial fraud" cases and three
were "antitrust" cases.

Without question, this pattern has

little to do with the perceived need for a new private civil
remedy to attack organized crime.

1/See "The RICO Questionnaire Results", remarks by John
K. Tabor before ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Secu
rities, RICO Program, April 6, 1984 (hereafter "ABA RICO Task
Force Report".)
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Another recently completed private survey located
132 civil RICO cases in which opinions have been published.
According to the descriptions of allegations contained in
those cases, they fall into the following categories:
Securities transactions

57

Commercial and contract disputes

38

Commodities trading

6

Bank loans

6

Antitrust price fixing

3

Religious disputes

2

Divorce

1

Union affairs

3

Commercial bribery/kickbacks

2

Political corruption (including
official extortion and bribery)

9

Theft (by cleaners from apartment dwellers)

1

Violent crimes (murder, arson, extortion)

3

Thus, cases that could fairly be characterized as having

anything to do with aiding the war on organized crime are
a tiny minority.
Congress did not express any expectation that the
prospect of treble damages would induce citizens injured by
organized crime to come forward to supplement the resources of

federal and local law enforcement officers by bringing suit
against offenders whom the prosecutors had not charged.

If

there had been any such assumption, it would have proven to
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be illusory.

Apparently, the only three civil RICO cases

involving allegations of gangster-like conduct — murder,

arson and extortion — were tag-along cases filed after the

authorities had obtained criminal convictions.
v. Janovich, 543 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982)

See Anderson
(tavern owner

claimed that convicted competitors tried to control local

tavern business through threats of murder and arson); State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp.

673 (N.D. Ind. 1982)

(insurance company sought to recover

fraudulently obtained proceeds after convictions in arson-forhire case); City of Milwaukee v. Hansen, No. 7 7-C-246 (E.D.

Wis. January 13, 1981)

(city sought to recover costs incurred

in fighting fires started by convicted arsonists).

In addi

tion, nine other civil RICO cases also followed criminal
convictions, generally for some form of political corruption.
In most civil RICO cases, however, the public

authorities have not found a basis to proceed with any criminal
charges.

There has been, therefore, no careful screening by

publicly accountable officials before those defendants have

been charged with criminal "racketeering."

This is not

surprising, because public officials would not have considered
it fair or accurate to brand the defendants in these cases

"racketeers."

Indeed, one commentator who maintains a computer

ized database of all published civil RICO decisions (which he
calculates as consisting of 40% alleged securities fraud cases
and 40% other kinds of alleged commercial fraud) concluded
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that, "realistically speaking, the likelihood of state or

federal prosecutors seeking indictments in the vast majority

of these types of cases is as close to zero as anything could
be."

Weissman, "Circuit Aims To Curb Private Civil RICO

Actions",

Legal Times, August 20, 1984, at 12.

Thus, these

civil cases are not supplementing the enforcement efforts of
prosecutors who simply lack the resources to deal with all the
offenses deserving prosecution.

Instead, these cases involve,

with rare exceptions, disputes that no responsible prosecutor
would brand as criminal, much less as the manifestations of

"organized crime" or "racketeering."

Congress added the civil treble-damage provision to
RICO in the expectation that this fearsome new weapon would be
directed at the forces of organized crime.

The members of

Congress who voted for RICO would surely be startled to learn
that RICO is actually being used almost entirely against the

very people who were intended to be its beneficiaries:

mate business people.

legiti

Although not limited to those in the

financial community and in related professional services, the
burden has become especially severe for these people because

they are viewed as vulnerable "deep pockets" whenever an invest
ment or a commercial transaction goes sour.

As the New York

Times reported, despite the expectation that civil RICO would
focus on "mobster deals," "legitimate businesses such as Morgan

Stanley, American Express, E.F. Hutton and Lloyd’s of London

found their names smeared with racketeering charges.
N.Y. Times, September 4, 1984, at D2.
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..."

A partial roster of

defendants in civil RICO suits includes the following estab
lished and respected entities that private claimants have

charged with a "pattern of racketeering":
Investment bankers and brokers
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc.
Bear Stearns & Co.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
Oppenheimer & Co.
Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.

National Accounting Firms

Alexander Grant & Company
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand
Laventhol & Horwath
Price Waterhouse
Banks

Citibank, N.A.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co.
First Interstate Bank of Oregon
First National Bank of Atlanta
First National Bank of Maryland
Ford City (Illinois) Bank & Trust Co.
Hunter Savings Association
Marine National Bank (Wisconsin)
National Republic Bank of Chicago
Pacific Western Bank
Sierra Federal Savings & Loan Association
State Bank of India

Insurance Companies
Prudential Insurance Co. of America
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London
USLIFE Corp.

These firms have been named as defendants in dozens of RICO
suits, even though the Justice Department has not seen merit

enough even to file a criminal charge against them, much less

to obtain a conviction.

Of course, the enormous expenses
16

associated with defending against unchecked civil RICO claims
become a cost of doing business that ultimately taxes the

consumers of the goods and services provided by these firms
and by their customers and clients.
C.

Civil RICO Is Used Most Extensively
In Ordinary Commercial Disputes

As the figures demonstrate, the vast bulk of private
civil RICO cases have come in commercial contexts — hardly

in the settings that Congress (or the Department of Justice)
thought needed bold new weapons and special incentives to

sue.

These cases fit within the language of RICO because the

commercial activities allegedly involved "mail fraud," "wire
fraud," or "fraud in the sale of securities."

The most extensive use of civil RICO at present is
in actions involving securities trading and other commercial

transactions.

All three recent comprehensive surveys of

reported decisions under RICO have ascertained that at least 80%
of RICO claims appear in cases that involve sales of securities
or commodities or relate to contract disputes or other ordinary
commercial transactions.

The cases reveal that RICO is being

applied to federalize simple common-law fraud, or to add the
threat of treble damages to cases already governed by federal

securities laws.

That latter use allows a plaintiff to

circumvent the carefully crafted limitations on the remedies
provided by the securities laws.

See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst

v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195, 206-211 (1976).

In neither

category of case, of course, is there any impact on "organized

crime."
17

Claims based on "mail fraud" and "wire fraud"
predicate offenses are easy to plead in many commercial

disputes.

They are also likely to survive motions to dismiss

made at early stages.

This is so because the underlying law

in this area has been developed in criminal prosecutions under

broadly worded criminal statutes.

Courts have been willing

to allow public officials to use broad prosecutorial discretion
in determining which transactions are properly prosecutable:

"The crime of mail fraud is [broad] in scope. The
fraudulent aspect of the scheme to 'defraud' is
measured by a non-technical standard.
Law puts
its imprimatur on the accepted moral standards and
condemns conduct which fails to match the 'reflection
of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair
play and right dealing in the general and business
life of members of society.' This is indeed broad."
Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir.
1967) (citations omitted).

In almost any instance where a venture has lost
money, or a stock has fallen in value, a disappointed investor

can allege that the businessman's behavior was not a "reflec

tion of moral uprightness" and "fair play."

Although Congress

has never authorized private civil suits under the mail fraud

statute, the inclusion of that offense as one of the predicates

for a civil suit under RICO has now given this vast discretion
to private claimants.

This system presents direct risks to the enforcement
discretion of the Department of Justice.

As we discuss in

more detail below, various trial and appellate courts have
been searching for some way to protect against the abusive use
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of civil RICO.

One way to do that would be to begin to narrow

the kind of conduct that constitutes "mail fraud.”

The

emergence of civil precedents that narrow the scope of RICO’s
predicate offenses would deprive the Department of its tradi
tional discretion, not because federal prosecutors are distort

ing the mail fraud statute but because private lawyers and

claimants are.

Similarly, private plaintiffs find it easy to level
allegations of "securities fraud."

Since the federal courts

are reluctant to dismiss complaints before a plaintiff has had

a chance to pursue substantial discovery in a search for

evidence to support his allegations of "fraud," these cases
Even if the predicate offense

withstand initial challenges.

that a plaintiff must ultimately prove in a civil RICO case is
criminal securities fraud, a plaintiff may not even have to
allege — much less prove — a deliberate intent to defraud

him.

For example, in United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311

(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976), the court
upheld the conviction of a partner in a major accounting

firm.

On the basis of a finding that he had "recklessly"

conducted a corporate audit, he was convicted of assisting in
the corporation’s filing of a false proxy statement in viola

tion of 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).

The trial judge in sentencing

the accountant indicated that no finding of actual knowledge
of falsity was necessary for conviction:
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"I think you are absolutely sincere when you say
that you do not believe that you did anything
wrong in this audit or audits. . . . But the
tragedy is that the jury found that this was an
audit or audits done with reckless disregard for
what was really involved.” United States v.
Natelli, 74 Cr. 43 (S.D.N.Y.), Transcript of
sentencing at 12.

Thus, a plaintiff may be able to assert a viable RICO claim

based on alleged "fraud in the sale of securities" simply by

claiming that the defendants were reckless in their actions,
and that, as a result, a "fraudulent" filing or similar

securities law violation occurred.

This, in turn, permits

the private claimant to brand the defendant a racketeer.

All its sponsors expressly agreed that RICO was

aimed at preventing the infiltration of legitimate business
by organized crime.

The draftsmen certainly did not intend,

for example, to have RICO become a device for challenging

corporate takeover bids or to add a new level of regulation

of those hotly contested deals.

Yet, according to the ABA

RICO Task Force Report, there have been at least six reported

"tender offer" cases in which RICO claims were asserted by at
least one of the contestants for corporate control.

In Dan

River, Inc. v. Ichan, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983), the court
of appeals recently expressed concern about attempts to use

RICO to block a takeover bid through a public tender offer,
pointing out that this is simply one illustration of the

unintended and excessive use of civil RICO:
"Finally, we note the mounting controversy in the
federal courts over the proper limits, if any,
upon the use of RICO in cases far removed from
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the context which Congress had in mind when it
enacted the statute.
Congress was out to attack
the problem of organized crime, not the problem
of corporate control and risk arbitrage. We of
course make no attempt to resolve the dispute
here and now. We do not propose to enter the
fray. We only note that the reach of RICO is
itself a troubling issue. . ." Id. at 291.
See also, Tyson & August, The Williams Act After RICO:

Has

The Balance Tipped In Favor Of Incumbent Management?, 35

Hastings L.J. 53, 111-12 (1983) ("By giving target management

a powerful new weapon in the takeover battle, the judicial
approval of RICO suits predicated on Williams Act violations

undermines the careful policy of evenhandedness that the

Williams Act Congress sought so hard to attain".)
The treble-damage weapon of RICO and the "racketeer
ing" label are also being used to challenge the ways banks set
up their loan procedures and terms.

For instance, in Morosani

v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir.
1983), the 11th Circuit has allowed a case to proceed on the

claim that the "prime rate" used in computing the interest on
the plaintiff's loan was not the bank’s true prime rate.

Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 681

In

(N.D. Ill. 1982), the

court explained why it, too, had to entertain a RICO suit

involving alleged misrepresentations relating to a commercial

loan:

"Congress may not have envisioned that the civil
remedies it supplied in RICO would find the wide
spread use that they have in commercial fraud
cases. And such use of RICO’s remedies may well
be somewhat undesirable. But, when a plaintiff
makes allegations which appear to state a claim
under the statute as it is written, it is not the
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function of this Court to reject that claim on the
ground that Congress must have meant something
other than what it said in the statute."
This thoroughly unanticipated use of civil RICO has lead
several sections of the American Bar Association to establish

"yet another group to study RICO litigation .

.

. primarily

in response to the prime rate RICO cases now about six-monthsold.

.

.

."

BNA, Securities Reg. & Law Rep. 1393 (Aug. 17,

1984) .

RICO counts have already appeared in many other cases
involving disputed commercial transactions, including churning

2/
3/
of stock,2/ representations about a broker’s expertise,3/
projections used in real estate syndication,4/ disputes between

landlord and tenant,5/ disallowance of insurance claims,6/
alleged overcharges by a printer,7/ and failure to publish

a medical journal according to a contractual agreement.8/

2/
. .
2/ See, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Securities Interna
tional ,"Inc.75545 F. Supp. 1002 (C. D. Cal 1982).

3/See, e.g., Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D.
Colo. 1983).
4/Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1188 ( 1983).

5/Pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 554 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
6/
—Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 564 F.
Supp. 352(E.D. Mich. 1983).
7/Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., 558 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

8/American Society of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery &
Optha1mology v. Murray Communications, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 462
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
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Because Congress included open-ended "fraud" predicates, there

is ample room for transforming even more commercial disputes

into RICO cases.

It should be of special concern to the Department
of Justice that the mail fraud and wire fraud predicates are

so broad that at least one federal court has held that those
predicates support a civil RICO claim for damages against FBI

agents who orchestrated an undercover "sting" operation.

Lightner v. Tremont Auto Auction, (N.D. Ill.), RICO Litigation
Reporter 317 (September 1984).

It is hard to imagine a more

glaring illustration of the point that civil RICO is now being
used against the very people it was designed to aid.

Although the "fraud" predicates are the easiest to
abuse by artful pleading, they are not alone.

In one of the

most recent appellate decisions, the Fourth Circuit ordered
reinstatement of a civil RICO case brought by a condominium

developer who alleged that the purchasers of an office condo

minium unit were trying to "extort" an unreasonably high
price from him in connection with the developer’s effort to

repurchase the condo unit in order to include it in a block
of units the developer wanted to sell to IBM.

Although the

district court found that this was "at best a garden-variety
commercial breach of contract" case, the Fourth Circuit con

cluded that the allegations might make out a claim of "extor
tion" under state law and, therefore, the plaintiff could

press the case under RICO.

Battlefield Builders, Inc. v.

Swango, (4th Cir. No. 83-1797)

(opinion filed September 20,
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1984).

The two businessmen who originally bought the condomin

ium unit — and their wives as co-defendants — now stand accused

of being racketeers and must defend themselves against a statute

that Congress believed would protect business people from, in
Representative Steiger’s words, "ruthless organized criminals."

D.

Most Courts Have Disclaimed Responsibility
For Reforming Civil RICO’s Overbreadth.

Several trial judges have attempted to restrain
the use of civil RICO in ordinary commercial disputes.

They

have, for example, tried to treat the statute as requiring an

allegation of some actual connection with "organized crime."
E.g., American Savings Ass’n v. Sierra Federal Savings & Loan

Ass'n, No. 83-JM-1889 (D. Colo. June 7, 1984); Richardson v.
Shearson/American Express Co., 573 F. Supp. 133, 137 (S. D. N. Y.
1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983).
Other trial courts also have tried to give some

sensible limit to the scope of RICO by requiring a showing of
some special "racketeering injuries."

For example, Alton v.

Alton, 82 Civ. 0795 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1982), involved a RICO

claim prompted by a dispute over division of property in a
divorce suit.

While the judge acknowledged that the plain

tiff’s complaint "may perhaps fit within the literal language

of the statute," he dismissed the RICO claim, because:

"[t]his action concerns a matrimonial dispute with
claims of fraudulent inducement of a separation
agreement and fraudulent acts in the administration
of that agreement during the course of which the
mails and telephone wires were used. To extend the
treble damage provision of Section 1964 of the
criminal statute to marital disputes setting forth
individual claims of common law fraud, would
- 24 -

produce a result not in conformity with the intent
of the drafters of the statute. To allow such a
remedy in this action would, in effect, establish
a federal law of fraud, a treble damage remedy for
any two instances of fraudulent conduct where the
mails or wires are used." Id. at 8-9.
Several other recent RICO cases illustrate the

full range of the distortion to which the present language

of the civil RICO provision lends itself and the difficulties
the courts are having in applying the statute sensibly.

In

at least two instances RICO has been invoked in religious
squabbles, and the trial judges have struggled to make RICO

inapplicable.

In Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc.,

535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982), the district court was
faced with a claim brought by a disaffected former adherent

of the Scientologists alleging fraudulent misrepresentations.
In dismissing the RICO counts the court stated:
"We do not believe Congress intended § 1964(c)
to afford a remedy to every consumer who could
trace purchase of a product to a violation of
§ 1962. . . . Such an interpretation would open
the federal courts to frequent RICO treble damage
claims by federalizing much consumer protection
law and by inviting plaintiffs to append RICO
claims for consumer fraud to nonfederal claims
thereby achieving treble damage recovery and a
federal forum. . . . Absent a clear statement
that Congress intended such a result, we believe
courts should confine S 1964(c) to business loss
from racketeering injuries." Id. at 1137.

The RICO claim in Congregation Beth Yitzhok v.

Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), turned on a
dispute about the proper succession to the "Skolyer Rebbe”, a

Chassidic Jewish leadership position.

The plaintiffs invoked

"mail fraud" and other predicate offenses based on alleged

25

misrepresentations by the defendants about their right to
administer the congregation.

In considering the propriety of

a RICO claim, the court pointed to the lack of an alleged link

to organized crime:
"a line must be drawn somewhere, lest every
garden variety dispute become a matter of federal
concern. ... No matter how expansive a view of
RICO jurisdiction one is inclined to take, this
case should fall beyond the pale. After all, it
must be recalled that the statute was designed
to 'rid the American economy and the channels of
interstate commerce from the influences of organ
ized crime' (citations omitted)." Id. at 557.9/
The recent trend in the courts of appeals, however,
has been to disapprove all of these judicial efforts to reform

RICO.

For example, after the Beth Yitzhok decision the Second

Circuit specifically rejected the limiting principle proposed
there, the absence of an alleged link to "organized crime."
Noting that the language of the statute is very broad,

the Second Circuit stated that the courts may not insert what

Congress failed to include:

some specific language that would

limit RICO’s application to persons or offenses involved in
organized crime.

See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d

5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984).
The Seventh Circuit, too, has ruled in another commercial case

that the statute does not require the plaintiff to show that
the defendant has any connection with "organized crime".
Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir.

9/The ultimate dismissal of the claim was based on a
finding that the religious issues raised were non-justiciable,
566 F. Supp. at 558.

- 26

1984).

The other circuits that have addressed this issue

have similarly rebuffed efforts by trial judges to confine the

expansive statutory language of civil RICO within sensible
limits that would direct it at the evil — and the evil-doers

— Congress had in mind.

See, e.g., Alcorn County v. U.S.

Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting requirement of link to organized crime); Owl Con

struction Co., v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540
(5th Cir. 1984)

(same); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058-59

(8th Cir. 1982), modified en banc, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 527 (1983)

(reinstating RICO claims against insurance

company and others based on alleged mismanagement of retirement

comm unity); Morosani v. First Nat'l. Bank of Atlanta, supra,
(reinstating RICO claims against banks based on allegedly

excessive interest rates charged to certain customers).

For the most part, other attempts at judicial
solution of the problem also have been unavailing.

In another

massive RICO case, for example, Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d

1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983),

the State Insurance Commissioner is alleging that an insurance

company fraudulently under-estimated the necessary "loss
reserves” that it should have maintained.

The suit is being

pressed under RICO on the ground that the use of the mails

to circulate the company's financial statements constituted
numerous separate acts of mail fraud.

The defendants include

three national accounting firms as well as the former officers
and directors of the insurance company.
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In allowing the

action to proceed, the court of appeals expressed its concern
about RICO’s "vast impact upon the federal-state division of

substantive responsibility for redressing" allegedly illegal

conduct.

711 F.2d 1353.

Nevertheless, the court rejected

arguments that RICO should apply only where the defendants
caused some "competitive injury" to the plaintiff; the court

held that the courts are simply "without authority to restrict
the application of the statute."

Id.

The Eighth Circuit has

rejected restrictions based either on "competitive injury" or
"racketeering injury."

See Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany

Industries, Inc., (8th Cir. No. 83-1608)
20, 1984)

(opinion filed August

(RICO suit by accounting firm against its audit

client); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir.

1982),

aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 710 F.2d 1361 (en banc), cert.

denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
Quite recently, a bitterly divided Second Circuit
released a series of decisions in which three panels disagreed

over the gloss that the courts may place on the terms of civil

RICO.

One panel decided by 2-1 vote (with one retired judge

in the majority) that a private civil RICO case requires alle
gation and proof of both (1) criminal conviction under RICO or

on the predicate offenses and (2) injury from the "racketeering

enterprise" distinct from injury flowing from the predicate
acts.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., (2d Cir. No. 83-7965)

(opinion filed July 25, 1984).

A second panel, also by 2-1

vote, decided to apply a requirement of a "distinct RICO

injury" without also addressing the "prior conviction" issue.
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Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, (2d Cir. No. 83-7636) (opinion
filed July 26, 1984).

A third panel, however, rejected all of

the approaches adopted by the two prior panels but was never
theless bound to apply them in the absence of en banc recon
Furman v. Cirrito, (2d Cir. No. 84-7113)

sideration.

(opinion

filed July 27, 1984) .
Even within the Second Circuit it is difficult to

discern the status of civil RICO cases, but the disarray
promises more years of confused litigation.

The approach

endorsed by the panel in Furman more accurately reflects the
attitude of appellate courts in other circuits:

"We think

that any restrictions of RICO along the lines urged by defen
dants must come from Congress, not the judiciary."
at 5656.

Slip op.

Moreover, since that recent trilogy, two other cir

cuits have reinstated civil RICO complaints, declining to

apply the limitations fashioned by two panels in the Second
Circuit.

Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc.,

supra; Butterfield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, supra.
E.

Civil RICO Claims Against
Legitimate Businesses Are Burgeoning

It is likely that, in light of the judicial unwilling

ness or inability to correct the overbreadth of the statute,

RICO suits simply alleging securities fraud, commercial fraud,
or other "imaginative" claims will continue to grow.

The

situation is already out of hand and destined to get worse.
Relatively few private RICO cases have progressed

all the way to judgment, because intensive use of the statute
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in civil cases only began to blossom a few years ago.

The ABA

RICO Task Force Report found that, although the statute was
enacted in 1970, there was at most one reported opinion in a

civil RICO case in each year up through 1979.

were opinions in three civil RICO cases.

In 1980, there

The number grew to

22 in 1981, to 25 in 1982 and to 58 in 1983.

Of course, published decisions are only the tip of
the iceberg.

Lawyers and businessmen have reported that the

mere threat to file a RICO suit has led to handsome settle

ments; this use of RICO never shows up in judicial statistics

or in reported judicial decisions.

Moreover, many complaints

are doubtless at a procedural stage well before any rulings

that would appear in published opinions.

It is reasonable

to infer, therefore, that several hundred formal RICO claims

have been filed in the last few years.

Virtually all of them

accuse well-established and generally respected business people;
few, if any, take on the affiliates of organized crime.

And

the numbers are increasing steadily and substantially.
The invocation of RICO against legitimate businesses

in kinds of dispute never contemplated by Congress when it
passed RICO is almost certain to accelerate.

The decisions

by four courts of appeals (the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits), which have reluctantly adopted a broad,

literal reading of the statute's sweep, all appeared in the
last year and a half.

Civil RICO claims are, therefore, far

more likely to survive, and hence to be utilized, than they
were even 18 months or two years ago.
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In addition, there is rapidly spreading publicity

about the utility of RICO as a device for getting a local
commercial dispute into federal court or as a tactic for
dramatically increasing the stakes in a case otherwise covered

by the traditional single-damage feature of other, specific

federal laws, such as the securities laws.

Legal and business

journals are filled with articles discussing the statute.
See, e.g., Skinner and Tone, "Recent Developments in RICO
Litigation", National Law Journal, February 13, 1984, at 20;
Skinner and Tone, "Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant",

National Law Journal, January 30, 1984, at 22; Flaherty,

"Private RICO Damages Awarded", National Law Journal, December
26, 1983 at 8; Sylvester, "Civil RICO’s New Punch", National
Law Journal, February 7, 1983 at 1; Weissmann, "’Moss' Makes

RICO Statute the Darling of Plaintiffs’ Bar", Legal Times,
December 19, 1983 at 24; Murphy, "RICO — A Federal Treble

Damage Fraud Statute?", New York State Bar Journal, July 1983
at 18; "Business is Picking Up An Anticrime Weapon", Business
Week, February 20, 1984, at 85.

So too, law reviews are focusing a great deal of
attention on the statute, debating the extent of its flaws

and the proper methods of correcting them.

August, The Williams Act After RICO:

See, e.g., Tyson &

Has The Balance Tipped

In Favor Of Incumbent Management, 35 Hastings L.J. 53 (1983);

Note, RICO and Securities Fraud:

A Workable Limitation, 83

Colum. L. Rev. 1513 (1983); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation
and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1101
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(1982); Campbel1, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial Litigation,
36 Southwestern L.J. 925 (1982).

Numerous how-to-do-it courses are being offered

nationwide to acquaint lawyers with RICO's possibilities.
For example, the ABA already has held three "continuing legal

education" National Institutes on RICO, two in New York City

in September 1983 and February 1984, and one in Los Angeles
in November 1983.

With ominous accuracy the ABA has titled

these sessions "RICO:

Commercial Litigation."

The Ultimate Weapon in Business and
The popularity of the presentations

is great; the mailing for the February 1984 course pointed out

that the two earlier meetings were sold out, with over 600

lawyers in attendance.

One of the programs held at the ABA's

annual convention in August 1984 was entitled "RICO:
Current Status of Baby Huey.”

The

The ABA is planning to hold

another National Institute on RICO in New York in October 1984

entitled "RICO - The Second Stage."

Among the featured topics

are discussions of RICO and its impact on states and municipal
ities, RICO suits by and against unions, and RICO suits against
financial institutions.
The Practicing Law Institute ("PLI") also held RICO

sessions in June of this year both in New York City and in San
Francisco, with topics including the use of RICO in "antitrust

cases", "commercial bribery and faithless employee cases,"

"unfair competition cases," "securities and commodities cases,”
and "corporate takeover cases.”

In addition, Law & Business,

Inc., offered RICO programs in Chicago in June and in San
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Francisco in July.

The volume of RICO litigation is expected

to be so heavy that a special reporting service called the

"RICO Litigation Reporter" began regular publication in May
1984 with a first issue containing over 200 pages of articles
and reports on RICO decisions.

This almost frantic preoccupation with RICO as the
"ultimate weapon” in commercial litigation reflects the view

that, in light of the actual, even if unintended, scope of

civil RICO:

"a plaintiff’s attorney zealously protecting
the rights of his client, as he is charged to
do, is obligated to bring RICO claims where
they can reasonably be interposed." Brodsky,
"RICO", New York Law Journal, February 15, 1984,
at p. 1, Col. 1.
The bonanza for lawyers in RICO cases is widely
and candidly recognized.

Indeed, when the Los Angeles Times

recently did a series of articles on "the litigation explo

sion," it devoted a front page article just to private civil
RICO suits, entitling the feature, "’RICO’ Running Amok in the
Board Rooms", and subtitling the piece, "Law aimed at Mafia

becomes popular in private suits."

February 15, 1984.

Siegel, Los Angeles Times,

The article quoted one RICO lawyer as

explaining that when he recently set up his private law

practice he "was looking for a way to develop business," and
he "studied RICO and saw the potential for lots of civil

litigation."
Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that private

lawyers selecting claims that may "appropriately" be brought
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under RICO will show the kind of restraint and discipline

manifested by the Justice Department.

As long as the statute

remains worded as broadly as the courts have viewed it, lawyers

will have every incentive to continue pushing its use to the

outer limits of the statutory language.
As the Los Angeles Times article accurately reported,

the "most general response by trial judges to these suits has
been dismay," but, as discussed above, most appellate courts

have said that the judiciary must take the law as written
and apply it.

The dismay of trial judges is understandable,

since these circuit holdings do more than legitimize creative

lawyering, they allow cases to proceed that are attempting to

shift hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

In Schacht

v. Brown, supra, for example, the plaintiff demands more than

one hundred million dollars in actual damages from the account
ing firms and insurance company officials who are defendants.
Complaint at ¶ 81.

300 million dollars.

With trebling, the claim is for over

So too in Bennett v. Berg, supra, the

plaintiffs are seeking several million dollars even before

trebling.

Thus, the total sums claimed in all RICO cases

represent an effort to redistribute huge amounts.

The drag

on the economy from all these contingent liabilities must be
substantial.

Of course, in addition to multiple damages the
plaintiffs in these actions seek attorneys fees.

While there

are few civil RICO cases that have progressed far enough to
have reached the fee-determination stage, the amounts at issue
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are substantial10/
.
Awards
of hundreds of thousands or even

millions of dollars are not uncommon under other statutes that
contain similar "fee shifting" provisions.

The prospect of

such handsome awards is a powerful stimulus to press RICO to

even newer frontiers.
Furthermore, at least two decisions hold that state

courts also may entertain RICO claims.

See, Greenview Trading

Co., Inc., v. Hershman & Leicher, P.C., 24999-83 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., New York County), printed in New York Law Journal, March
13, 1984 at 5; and LaVay Corp. v. First National Bank of Mary
land, 83-1020 (Md. Cir. Ct., Prince George’s County, March

5, 1984)

[both discussed in "Two States Lay Claim to RICO",

National Law Journal, May 7, 1984 at 3].

Thus, even in a

circuit where the federal courts have tried to place some

limits on civil RICO, a plaintiff may simply bring a RICO
complaint in the state courts.

A state tribunal is not bound

by the interpretation given RICO by the lower federal courts.

See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072,
1075-76 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 483 (1971);
Seatec International, Ltd. v. Secretary of the Treasury, 525

F. Supp. 980, 982 (D.P.R. 1982).

Hence, forum shopping will

10/For example, in Schacht v. Brown, supra, the lead
counsel for the plaintiff Insurance Commissioner reported
billings of $363,737.00 through September of 1982.
"Insurance
Liquidations a Legal Bonanza", Chicago Tribune, September 12,
1982, § 5 at 1. This may include expenses for some items
in addition to the Schacht litigation itself, but the vast
majority is almost certainly for that civil RICO action, in
a period before any significant discovery had commenced.
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almost certainly occur, and plaintiffs will attempt to convince
state courts to adopt the broadest possible construction of

RICO.

This involvement of state courts simply adds another

level of expense and confusion for legitimate businesses facing

RICO suits and undermines any hope that litigation and judicial
rulings are a practical route to solving the problems with
RICO.

V.

REFORM OF CIVIL "RICO" SHOULD
REFLECT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S
CAREFUL SCREENING PROCESS
A.

The Administration, The Courts, And
Others Have Recognized The Need For Reform

The explosion of unjustified civil RICO cases is
already at hand, and the adverse effects of this development

on the courts and on legitimate business are direct, palpable,
and unwarranted.

It would be difficult to overstate the in

terrorem effect of civil RICO on legitimate businesses, even

though relatively few companies, so far, actually have been

ordered to pay treble damages in these cases.

As Business

Week reported:
"Lawyers say the number of court awards under RICO
is not an accurate measure of the problem, because
few cases go to trial: The mere threat of a headline
suggesting a connection with organized crime often
induces a settlement.” February 20, 1984 at 85.

In addition, the scope of the permissible allegations permits

wide-ranging pre-trial discovery:

"That gets very, very

expensive,” one securities lawyer was quoted as explaining,

"and the cost tends to result in settlements."

36

Id.

In urging reform, the American Bar Association has
recognized :

"When RICO is combined with mail fraud predicate
offenses, the effect is to federalize all torts
involving business transactions in which a party
thinks deceitfully and uses the mails. This
result is undesirable in two respects:
(1) the
efficient operation of federal courts will be
significantly impaired, if not crippled, by a tidal
wave of RICO civil actions when plaintiffs become
aware of the attractions of treble damages and
recovery of attorney’s fees; and (2) the balance
between state and federal power will be substan
tially disrupted.
If future RICO statutes are
to include civil remedies, use of mail fraud as
a predicate offense must be limited.” Reports
with Recommendations to the House of Delegates,
ABA, 1982 Annual Meeting, August 1982, Report
No. 112C at 8, adopted by the House of Delegates
August 1982.
According to the recent ABA RICO Task Force Report, fully 74%
of all lawyers with actual experience with RICO claims, either

as counsel for plaintiffs or for defendants, believe that the

statute should be amended, and only 8% see no need for reform.
From his unique vantage point as a regulator of
securities industry and the accounting profession, SEC Commis

sioner Charles L. Marinaccio recently expressed his view that
civil RICO has "gone awry in the execution," is being used

against "the very legitimate corporations and businesses that
were intended to be protected," to undermine the "carefully
crafted structures" of express and implied remedies under

state and federal securities laws.

Executives A-6 (September 21, 1984).

See BNA, Daily Report for

As a result the SEC

Commissioner concluded:
"In my judgment, Congress needs to revisit the
RICO statute. It should specifically make clear in
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the statute that before a civil claim may be filed
under RICO the predicate of a criminal charge by the
government is a necessity.
It should further make
clear that a ’racketeering' type injury needs to
be shown. That is, that more than injury arising
from the individual violations need be shown. What
should be required is an injury which results from a
pattern of racketeering to the competitive position
of the enterprise alleging the harm. Perhaps the
Supreme Court will do the job. But I believe it is
the responsibility of the Congress to take RICO off
its head and stand it on its feet."

Federal judges, acting in their capacity as com

mentators on what they are witnessing, also have spoken out
in public about the problem.

Thus, District Judge Milton

Pollack of New York recently said:
"one of the proliferating developments in civil
litigation has been the use of RICO, the Racketeer
Influenced and [Corrupt] Organizations Act, in
civil claims, in routine commercial disputes,
including those arising under the Federal Securi
ties Laws.
I think that the proliferation of
those claims and the use of a law that was designed
to eliminate organized crime is a very bad influ
ence on the commercial community".
"Symposium
Highlighting Developments in Securities Law Over
Past Century," New York Law Journal, January 30,
1984 at 52.
And Judge Abner Mikva of the United States Court of

Appeals in Washington, who had warned against the overbreadth

of the proposed RICO bill when he was in Congress in 1970,
has seen RICO outstrip his worst fears.

He warned then that

placing a treble-damage remedy under so broadly worded a

statute would provide an "invitation" to the "disgruntled and
malicious" to "harass innocent businessmen..."

H. R. Rep.

No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code

Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4083.

As he predicted, "What a pro

tracted, expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the adverse
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publicity may well accomplish — destruction of the rival’s
business."

Judge Mikva was quoted in a recent interview as

expressing regret that these problems were not avoided by
complete deletion of the civil provision, which "was not an

important element of the legislation."

Los Angeles Times,

February 15, 1984.
In their formal opinions as well, many courts have

warned about these dangers and abuses, even while deciding

that they are obliged to apply the expansive language of the
statute as originally written.

For example, in allowing a

mail fraud allegation to proceed as a RICO case, the Seventh
Circuit in Schacht ruefully observed that Congress inadvert

ently "may well have created a runaway treble damage bonanza
for the already excessively litigious."

Schacht v. Brown,

supra, 711 F.2d at 1361.
In another Seventh Circuit case, the court observed

that RICO "is constructed on the model of a treasure hunt,"
Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 652

(7th Cir. 1984), and went out of its way to comment:
"[w]e must abide by Congress's decision, made at a
time of less sensitivity than today to the workload
pressures on the federal courts and to the desir
ability of maintaining a reasonable balance between
state and federal courts, however much we may regret
not only the burdens that the decision has cast
on the federal courts but also the displacement of
state tort law into the federal courts that it has
brought about.” Id. at 654.

There is a consensus in the appellate courts that it
is up to Congress, not the courts, to remedy the undesirable
effects of the way RICO was originally drafted:
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"The legislature having spoken, it is not our role
to reassess the costs and benefits associated with
the creation of a dramatically expansive, and
perhaps insufficiently discriminate, tool for
combating organized crime." Schacht v. Brown,
supra, 711 F.2d at 1361.

"[W]e are cautioned by the Supreme Court that
broad Congressional action should not be restricted
by the courts in the name of federalism. ... It
is beyond our authority to restrict the reach of
the statute." Bennett v. Berg, supra, 685 F.2d at
1064 (panel opinion).
"Complaints that RICO may effectively federalize
common law fraud and erode recent restrictions on
claims for securities fraud are better addressed to
Congress than to courts." Moss v. Morgan Stanley
Inc., supra, 719 F.2d at 21.

In the words of former District Court Judge Simon Rifkind:

"I have a feeling about RICO in the civil
world, not in the criminal side, as being the most
conspicuous case I know of legislation requiring
Congressional attention for revision."
"Symposium
Highlighting Developments in Securities Law Over
Past Century," New York Law Journal, January 30,
1984 at 52.
The Administration has heard these calls for

reform and has decided that they are well founded.

The

Vice President's Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services

whose members include the Attorney General, recognized in its
final report adopted on July 2, 1984, that civil RICO is being

abused.

The Task Group found that

"a statute designed to control organized crime
through both criminal and civil penalties against
racketeering... has increasingly been utilized
by imaginative lawyers in suits against banks,
securities firms, accountants and other perfectly
legitimate businesses without even any alleged
connection to organized crime."

The Report continued:
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"This litigation increases the backlog in federal
courts, undermines the structure of the substantive
banking and securities laws enacted by Congress, and
creates totally unnecessary costs for the affected
firms and, ultimately, their customers."

Accordingly, one of the Task Group’s recommendations (number
5.15) calls for "Elimination of Nuisance Litigation Under

RICO."

Without defining precisely how RICO should be amended,

the Task Group states as a goal the formulation of amendments

"to ensure that its civil liability provisions are not mis

used by private parties in litigation involving financial
institutions."

B.

The Justice Department’s RICO
Guidelines Point The Way To Reform

In 1981, the Criminal Division of the United States

Department of Justice promulgated "Guidelines" for the exer

cise of the Department’s power to initiate criminal prosecu

tions under RICO.
Ch. 110 (1981).

See 9 United States Attorney’s Manual,

The Guidelines were promulgated because the

Department recognized the great possibility for abuse if RICO

is applied to every set of circumstances that may conceivably

be covered by the broad statutory language.
Many of the concerns reflected in the Justice
Department Guidelines apply with equal force to private civil

litigation under RICO.

These internal Guidelines, however, do

not regulate the activity of private plaintiffs.

Therefore,

legislation is necessary in order to erect similar safeguards
around the private civil RICO mechanism and in that way to
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minimize its great potential for abuse.

Both the policies

reflected in the Guidelines and the screening process that

they establish suggest some approaches to reform of civil
RICO.
1.

Private Civil RICO Claims Should Be
Permitted Only After The Defendant Has
Been Convicted Of A Related Crime.

In their "Preface," the Guidelines state that,
despite the statutory provision that RICO is to be "liberally

construed to effectuate its remedial purpose," it is the

policy of the Department of Justice that RICO should only be
used "selectively.”

The Guidelines are designed to assure

"that not every case, in which technically the elements of a

RICO violation exists, will result in the approval of a RICO
charge."

The Justice Department will not "approve ’imagina

tive' prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the
Congressional purpose of the RICO statute."

As the Guidelines

recognize, "the activity which Congress most directly addressed
— the infiltration of organized crime in the nation's economy"

— is the touchstone for determining whether a RICO charge is
warranted.

This is the same limiting principle that a number

of federal trial judges have attempted to impose on civil RICO
claims but that appellate courts have said would require

legislative change.
In addition, Guideline V states that, in order to
constitute a violation of RICO, the "pattern of racketeering

activity" should have "some relation to the purpose of the
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enterprise."

This sensible interpretation is not followed

in the civil cases that have been filed under RICO, where
allegedly fraudulent activities conducted by legitimate

businesses such as investment banking houses, brokerage firms,
accounting firms, law firms, and others are — even if true

— aberrational rather than related to the purpose of those
"enterprises."
Moreover, the overall theme of the Guidelines, as

stated in their preface, is that "the consequences for the

accused" require "particularly careful and reasoned applica
tion" of RICO’s purposes before making the decision to charge

a RICO violation.

Accordingly, the Guidelines insist on

careful monitoring and centralized control over the Govern

ment’s filing of any RICO charge.

This centralized monitoring

guarantees that the Guidelines will be effectively enforced
by officials who are charged with public accountability.

In dramatic contrast, the decision whether to file a private
RICO claim under the broadly worded statute is currently left

wholly to the discretion of entrepreneurial private lawyers.
Their sole loyalty is to their private clients, and they have

no public responsibility for the consequences of any extrava
gant allegations.
There is one straight-forward amendment to civil
RICO that would eliminate the existing abuses, refocus the

statute on its intended targets, and adapt the Justice Depart
ment’s Guidelines to the civil use of RICO.
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That would be

to permit civil claims to proceed under RICO only after

the defendant has been convicted of a RICO offense or of
at least one of the predicate offenses.

This amendment

would effectively curb the abuse of the discretionary power
to bring private claims against legitimate business people

involved in ordinary commercial activities.

It would confine

the circumstances in which suits can be filed to those in
which public prosecutors have screened those people who may

fairly be charged with being involved in "organized crime" or
"racketeering" from those who should not be subject to such
accusations.

This is the kind of protection that a panel of

the Second Circuit read into RICO in the Sedima case and that
SEC Commissioner Marinaccio called upon Congress to write into

the statute.
2.

Civil RICO Claims Should Not Overlap
Federal Statutes That Specifically
Regulate Commercial Transactions

The Justice Department Guidelines highlight another

problem with civil RICO as it currently stands.

The Preface

states that the Department ordinarily will not add a RICO
charge "which merely duplicates the elements of proof of a

traditional" statute that specifically covers the conduct
in question.

One of the major criticisms of the current

civil RICO provision, however, is that it creates a general,

private federal claim for treble damages even where federal
law already provides a carefully crafted set of prohibitions

and remedies.
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The most notable example of this unnecessary and

disruptive overlap involves the federal securities laws.

Those laws, which Congress and the courts have carefully shaped
over fifty years, define the responsibilities of various

categories of persons, prescribe the procedures to be followed
in maintaining civil suits, establish the time limits applica
ble in asserting those claims, and tailor the remedies availa

ble.

By including as a predicate the open-ended offense of

"fraud in the sale of securities," however, RICO allows private

claimants to duplicate — but for treble damages — the rights
already granted by the federal securities laws or allows them
to circumvent the limitations that Congress has deliberately
fashioned for civil suits under those laws.

In neither type

of situation is there any justification for tolerating the

substantial mischief that civil RICO permits.

Since federal

law comprehensively regulates securities transactions, a
person should be allowed to press a civil damage suit only

under the circumstances and only to the extent permitted under

those specific statutes.

When Congress decided to add securities fraud as
a RICO predicate, it referred to only one significant kind

of misconduct that was not already covered by the federal
securities laws but was attracting organized crime:

ficking in stolen or counterfeit securities.

traf

Experience has

shown, however, that civil RICO is not being used against

schemes of that type.

In any event, it is possible to include
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that kind of criminal activity in civil RICO without also
embracing every other conceivable "fraud in the sale of

securities."

3.

RICO Should Not "Federalize"
Purely State Law Claims

The Justice Department's Guideline III expressly
directs that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a RICO

count will not be asserted "where the predicate acts consist

solely and only of state offenses."

Reflecting important

considerations of federalism, the commentary explains that

this guideline is designed "to underscore the principle that

prosecution of state crimes ... is primarily the responsi

bility of state authority."
Similar observations apply to the use of the federal
courts to litigate civil disputes governed by state law.

Nevertheless, the inclusion of "mail fraud" and "wire fraud"
in RICO has been used by private plaintiffs as a device for

bringing into federal courts what are essentially local commer
cial or property disputes.

This use of RICO has "federalized"

state commercial and tort cases.

Moreover, as one former

federal prosecutor recently wrote in calling for legislation
to delete "the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes from the

list of predicate acts required to bring a private civil RICO
action":

"[A] general problem with RICO, that the constraints
of prosecutorial discretion and guidelines which
limit its application in the criminal sphere are no
bar to its private civil application . . ., is most
acute when the underlying predicate statutes are
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mail fraud and wire fraud, since it is the breadth
of these statutes, both actual and potential, that
forms the basis for most of the recent expansion,of
civil RICO litigation." Rakoff, RICO Litigation
Reporter 206-07, 211 (September 1984).

Continued inclusion of "mail fraud" and "wire fraud" as
predicates for civil RICO claims allows private plaintiffs to

disregard these concerns about federalism and to transform

local disputes into federal cases simply because one of the

parties used the mail or the telephone.

4.

RICO Should Not Apply To A
Single Episode Or Transaction

The statute makes any two occurrences of a predicate

violation within ten years sufficient to show a "pattern of
racketeering activity."

Guideline IV recognizes that this

definition is subject to abuse and provides that no RICO count
will be charged "based upon a pattern of racketeering activity
growing out of a single criminal episode or transaction."

Most of the private civil cases that have been
filed under RICO, by contrast, relate to allegedly fraudulent

activity in connection with a single episode or transaction,
such as the sale of stock in a single company or the structur
ing of a particular venture that includes a number of parties.

Since each mailing of, for example, a copy of an allegedly
misleading financial statement constitutes a separate viola

tion, it is easy for the artful pleader to allege a "pattern"

of racketeering in connection with a single commercial episode
or transaction.

This usage, however, has little to do with

the congressional goal of cracking down on racketeers who make
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their living by engaging in a continuous pattern of illicit

activity over a long career.
VI.

CONCLUSION
The need for reform is clear.

reform is clear.

The nature of the

And the responsibility for reform is clear.

The Justice Department, implementing the recommendation of
the Vice President's Task Group, should urge Congress to amend
the civil provisions of RICO to focus the private remedy on
its original purpose of aiding the war against organized crime,

while curing its capacity to bludgeon innocent business people.
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